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I. INTRODUCTION
Everything about Ohio v. American Express1 was wrong and the
adoption of “two-sided platform” reasoning into American antitrust
law might be one of its worst, most regrettable wrong turns in de
cades. That is not because the original theoretical model of two-sided
interaction has anything wrong with it at all. It is rather that nothing
© Copyright held by Chris Sagers. If you would like to submit a response to this
Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online Editor at lawrev
@unl.edu.
* James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law, Cleveland State University,
c.sagers@csuohio.edu. In the course of preparing this Article, I noted that to an
unusual degree the leading research published in this area has been either
funded by credit card companies or written by authors who have worked for
them. Cf. Brief for Amici Curiae Ahold U.S.A., Inc. et al., In Support of Petition
ers at 13–21, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454).
Therefore, it seemed worth stating that I have never received any funding, from
anyone, for this or any other research.
That said, I signed briefs of amici curiae supporting plaintiffs in the case, on
behalf of antitrust professors. Brief of 28 Professors of Antitrust Law as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)
(No. 16-1454); Brief of Amici Curiae 23 Antitrust Law Professors and Scholars in
Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Am. Express Co., 838
F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1672).
1. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
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could be gained by incorporating it that could be worth the result in
the American Express case itself, or the difficulty that has likely been
invited into antitrust litigation. The consequences are hard to predict,
but they may be severely limiting to our already moribund antitrust
enforcement. I will offer two major responses in this Article. Part II
states a simple theoretical argument to demonstrate an important
mistake in American Express. It was crucial for the American Express
majority to characterize its decision as simply a problem in product
market definition, but for the strictly strategic purpose of requiring
plaintiffs to prove that where markets are two-sided, the challenged
conduct reduces the quantity of the jointly demanded product. How
ever, quite contrary to the majority’s self-assured confidence, the antisteering rule at issue indeed could cause serious harm without reduc
ing the quantity of the jointly demanded card-swipe transactions. The
harm is dynamic and depends on the fact that, contrary to platform
theory’s presumption, elasticities are neither fixed nor exogenous.
Part III then explains how a deeper epistemological problem inherent
in cases like American Express, and in conservative antitrust law
more generally, poses very serious risks for the policy.
This reflects an old problem in antitrust. Ronald Coase once fa
mously mocked the “preoccupation” of mid-century economists “with
the monopoly problem.”2 When such “an economist finds something
. . . that he does not understand,” said Coase, “he looks for a monopoly
explanation.”3 Like some others of his little witticisms, that line has
been quoted dozens of times, usually to show how laughable the eco
nomic mainstream of his day was, and really the antitrust enterprise
itself. Because Coase further believed that “in this field we are very
ignorant,” he thought that “the number of ununderstandable practices
tends to be rather large, and reliance on the monopoly explanation,
frequent.”4 It was all quite absurd, you see.
If anything was absurd about it, though, it was just that the mo
nopoly preoccupation generated policy that seemed to Coase contrary
to prudent common sense. When Coase said that thing in 1972, the
Warren Court had effectively outlawed non-conglomerate acquisitions
of any size and literally all limits on intra-brand resale competition.5
The Court had very recently held components of seemingly desirable
2. R.H. COASE, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, 3 POLICY ISSUES
AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 66–67 (Victor R.
Fuchs, ed., 1972), reprinted in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 57–74
(1988).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HAND
BOOK 319–27, 472–73 (3d ed. 2016).
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joint ventures per se illegal,6 and the enforcement agencies were in
the midst of several huge, long-running monopolization challenges.
But even following those strictures, a popular clamor, led in part by
Ralph Nader, was gaining ground, stressing that American antitrust
had been much too soft on monopoly, and Congress was considering
blue-ribbon-panel recommendations for the nation’s first general, nofault deconcentration law.7 From Coase’s point of view, the antitrust
law of his day risked serious harm to the American economy to protect
against the merest possibility of confiscated surplus or deadweight
loss. The monopoly preoccupation seemed like it was wagging the
whole dog of competition policy, so much and so knee-jerkingly so that
it seemed driven more by the economists’ ideology than by the search
for empirical truth.
Well, if that sort of thing was absurd in Coase’s day, then it is ab
surd today as well. It was accordingly frustrating to read yet another
opinion like American Express. That was only partly because listening
to Clarence Thomas talk about American Express was like listening to
Donald Trump talk about Vladimir Putin.8 What was not merely tedi
ous was that something seems pretty far out of whack in American
payment systems, and yet the Court allowed the merest possibility of
accidental impediment to private enterprise to wag the entire dog of
competition policy. On the one hand, credit cards are in hugely com
mon use even though they are more costly to society than other pay
ment systems, and there is no strong evidence that (absent cardholder
premiums) they especially benefit either merchants or cardholders.9
Something has apparently gone wrong in these markets that shouldn’t
happen if they were working well. On the other hand, the challenged
conduct seemed like a grossly, facially anticompetitive restraint im
posed by the number two firm in a three-firm oligopoly, preserving a
practice the three of them had long followed until the other two gave it
up in the course of the same litigation. The restraint seemed ugly even
within the terms of the “two-sided” or “platform market” theory the
Court would adopt for it. It went to inter-system competition of the
kind that William Baxter condemned in his famous original formula
6. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
7. All this history is nicely explained in William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations:
The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Decon
centration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (1989). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduc
tion to The Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust & a Reprint of the Neal Report,
5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 217 (2009) (examining the history in more detail).
8. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2282 (2018) (explaining that
by offering its “superior rewards,” American Express has “stimulated competitive
innovations,” “increas[ed] . . . volume,” “improv[ed] . . . quality,” and even served
as a boon to the poor).
9. See infra section III.A.
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tion of the problem.10 It also involved massively mature platforms, in
which the incremental network value of additional participants
closely approximates zero. Yet American academia and a majority of
the Supreme Court bent over backwards to give that conduct the bene
fit of the doubt. The Court invoked the prohibitive machinery not only
of the rule of reason but of a new, bespoke variation on it that may be
quite a bit more demanding. It did that on no more than an a priori
demonstration that any stricter rule might jeopardize some possible
benefit, the size of which we can only guess.
It is not just the American Express case that is put in issue by this
sort of thing, or its particular economic theory. A deeper and genera
lizing purpose lurks within any such case, and in all conservative anti
trust law. Much more than mere mockery, Coase and those quoting
him have meant to imply a claim of fundamental epistemology and
policy. The claim is that law and social science should work in the
same way, so that where social science would be cautious the law must
be too. That claim defines the conservative ideology that has domi
nated American antitrust law for fifty years.
But, in turn, American Express entails a strong empirical assump
tion for which there is no systematic confirmation of any kind. It
presumes that in the presence of ignorance it is better not to act than
to act. Putting it a different way, it presumes that choosing not to act
in the administration of public policy is the same thing as choosing not
to decide in science. But that does not follow at all. In science, to reject
a hypothesis typically has no real consequences. It is a protocol of in
tellectual hygiene that is usually just the equivalent of keeping an
open mind and thinking some more. Choosing not to enforce the law is
not like that at all. It is deliberate and practically significant, because
it might permit conditions to fester that threaten worse loss than mis
taken government action. It is emphatically not just some neutral
stance of healthy caution; it is ideological, no less than the monopoly
preoccupation of yore. That is so because whether reticence is always
or even usually better than action is empirical, and it seems fraught,
complex, and unknown.
This Article will ask as an initial question whether the stance
taken in American Express was a worthwhile prophylaxis, comparing
the cost of its rule to the likelihood that some good was done by giving
credit cards this much leeway. I think the answer is no. It was a
counterproductive mistake. On the one hand, the history of the indus
try is not easy to explain; it seems complicated and it could be ex
plained in different ways. But it is still not so hard to answer the
question. The likelihood that enforcement would inadvertently cause
10. William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Eco
nomic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541, 586–87 (1983).
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harm to the industry seems very small and the cost of failing to en
force the law seems large. As a great appellate advocate wrote in brief
ing before the American Express Court: “whether theoretically
accurate or not,” special rules for purportedly special cases “introduce
occasions for lower courts to miss the forest for a tree they have mis
understood and that was never necessary to plant.”11
The problem in letting theory like this invade antitrust law is not
just that it gets one case or one narrow context wrong. It may very
well be that liberals like me have overreacted to American Express,
and that it will seem limited in hindsight. Many critics of my persua
sion took Credit Suisse12 as a very dangerous, foreboding case, but
then it was basically never applied outside its narrow context of exchange-listed securities.13 Illinois Brick14 in its day was taken by the
plaintiff bar as the end of their enterprise until they discovered that
state law would permit indirect purchaser actions, and that in many
cases they could find direct purchasers who would bring federal
claims. I hope that American Express will be like that. I hope it will be
like another antitrust decision by Justice Thomas, the weirdly illogical
Texaco v. Dagher,15 which seemed to turn on a misunderstanding of
the ancillary restraints rule. Dagher seemed scary at the time,16 but it
was quickly rendered essentially irrelevant by American Needle.17 If it
has any significance at all going forward, it will be limited pretty
closely to its facts.
I’m not as confident that that will be the case with American Ex
press, because times have changed a fair bit. This is in a large part
because of judicial appointments, and above all the appointment of
Justice Kavanaugh. In practice, in these modern times the personnel
of the Court has seemed quite a lot more important than the strength
of ideas.18 So, at a bare minimum, I expect we’ve wound up with an
11. Brief of 28 Professors of Antitrust Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
supra note * (drafted and filed on behalf of amici by Eric Citron of Goldstein &
Russell, PC).
12. Credit Suisse Sec. LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
13. For example, Credit Suisse was used to repeal antitrust implicitly in the narrow
context of Elec. Trading Grp., LLC v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, 588 F.3d 128 (2d Cir.
2009), but in other cases, even in seemingly analogous contexts of regulated com
modities or financial transactions, Credit Suisse has been distinguished. See
A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE SCOPE OF ANTITRUST (Christo
pher L. Sagers ed., 2014).
14. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
15. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
16. See Chris Sagers, American Needle, Dagher, and the Evolving Antitrust Theory of
the Firm: What Will Become of Section 1?, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, 2009, at 1
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Aug
09_FullSource.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/XAX3-8FJC].
17. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l. Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
18. See Chris Sagers, #LOLNothingMatters, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 7, 20–24 (2018);
Chris Sagers, Antitrust, Political Economy, and the Nomination of Brett Kava
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effectively impregnable antitrust immunity for a three-firm oligopoly.
It seems pretty likely, however, that it will extend further. I fear that
quite unlike Dagher’s career, American Express will be for platform
theory what Sylvania was for free riding. “Free riding” was another
theoretical advancement so self-evident that it could not be doubted,
and it wound up rendering an entire class of potentially harmful con
duct effectively per se legal. That remains the case even though, nowa
days, even the chief apologists for that conduct acknowledge that
explaining it by free-riding was probably quite wrong.19
II.

THE GREAT GENERALIZATION

Something old and important is lost sight of in a case like Ameri
can Express, and in theoretical efforts like the one on which it is
based. A rarely discussed idea built into American antitrust is that, as
far as the law is concerned, markets are all pretty much the same.
While opinions have varied over time about what should be illegal
and what should not, they mostly have not varied about how broadly
the law should apply. “Language more comprehensive” than that in
the antitrust statutes, the Supreme Court has said, “is difficult to con
ceive,”20 and accordingly the Court is convinced of Congress’s desire
“to strike as broadly as it could.”21 Thus, claims for exemption are at
least nominally frowned upon.22 More importantly, courts have been

19.

20.
21.
22.

naugh, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 19, 2018), http://harv
ardlpr.com/2018/09/19/antitrust-political-economy-and-the-nomination-of-brett
kavanaugh/ [https://perma.unl.edu/2VFH-RYXN].
See Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free
Riding, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 431 (2009). See generally Warren S. Grimes, A Dy
namic Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance: Inefficient Brand Promotion, Higher
Margins, Distorted Choices, and Retarded Retailer Innovation, 55 ANTITRUST
BULL. 101 (2010) (collecting criticism of the free-riding explanation).
United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
The Supreme Court did so in some of its earliest antitrust cases, as when it ap
plied the law against the railroads, despite them having been otherwise regu
lated shortly before 1890. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290,
314–27 (1897). Since then the courts have observed a strong presumption against
judge-made limits, see, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350
n.28 (1963); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), and they
purport to construe statutory exemptions narrowly. See, e.g., Union Lab. Life Ins.
Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726,
733 (1973); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956);
Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671–72 (7th
Cir. 1992). Each of the many blue-ribbon antitrust study commissions established
by Congresses and Presidents of both parties have urged repeal of existing ex
emptions and warned against new ones. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 338, 340–41 (2007); Phil C. Neal et al., Report of
the Task Force on Productivity and Competition, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 11
(1968); REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY (1969),
reprinted in 1 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 827 (1969); ATTORNEY GEN.’S
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mostly hostile to claims that when antitrust rules apply, they should
work in different ways to account for the special problems of particu
lar markets. As a still broadly basic American rule it is no defense to
attack competition itself.23 “Whatever may be [the] peculiar problems
and characteristics” of any given market, the Sherman Act “estab
lishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike.”24
A few related ideas built into the law are deeply implicit, rarely
mentioned, and relevant. Taken together, they amount to an empirical
vision of markets for use in antitrust litigation. First, antitrust law
measures outcomes only within partial equilibria and on a relatively
static basis. If a practice causes a net loss in its local market, it is
(supposed to be) legally irrelevant that it generates benefits in some
other market.25 Likewise, we define markets to include only those
competitors presently in them or that easily could be,26 and claim at
least nominally that subsequent entry does not matter unless it will
be pretty fast and pretty effective.27 Innovation and dynamic concerns
can be important in particular cases but ordinarily play no direct role.

23.

24.
25.

26.
27.

COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 269 (1955). Indeed, the so-called
“Shenefield Report” of 1979 contained seven full chapters comprehensively call
ing for their drastic limitation or repeal. 1 NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF
ANTITRUST LAW AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL 177–316 (1979).
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“The as
sumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free
market recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and
durability—and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free
opportunity to select among alternative offers.”); Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at
371 (holding that conduct challenged in antitrust “is not saved because, on some
ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed
beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judi
cial competence, and in any event has been made for us already, by Congress
when it enacted [the antitrust laws].”).
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940).
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 370–71; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FAIR TRADE
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 30, 30 n.14 (2010) [hereinafter 2010
HMGS]. As with so many other rules, modern practice has started chipping away
at the out-of-market efficiencies rule. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 56–57 (2006).
2010 HMGS, supra note 25, at 15–16.
Thus, the familiar SSNIP test of market definition is generally applied by asking
how many consumers would switch from some set of products if the price were
raised for 5% for one year. (The Guidelines no longer state an explicit time-frame
for measuring “non-transitory” increases, but the 1982 Guidelines specified one
year, and agency practice since seems generally to have followed that rule. See
John Harkrider, Operationalizing the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., 4, 4 n.8 (June 25, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/
legacy/2007/08/30/202598.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/NA73-TWJ4].) Likewise,
once markets are defined, entry is considered relevant only if it will be “timely,
likely, and sufficient,” and the agencies at least purport to apply that standard
aggressively. See 2010 HMGs, supra note 25, at 27–29.
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This is all to say that we usually care what happens in this market,
and care about it only if it will happen, more or less, now. Finally, in
antitrust law we do not ask whether the goods in question are impor
tant, or how they relate to other goods or services, or to labor or leisure
or any such thing. A cartel in paper clips is as illegal as one in heart
medicine or staple foods and it triggers the same remedies.
Built into the policy, then, is an even deeper empirical generaliza
tion. If antitrust should almost always apply to almost all sectors and
apply its handful of essentially simple rules in the same way to all of
them, then our policy must contain a commitment that markets are in
fact mostly the same. They are in need of pretty much the same degree
of simple price competitiveness, and they do not often differ in ways
relevant to antitrust law. Moreover, by attending only to the pricecompetitiveness of more-or-less static partial equilibria, without too
much clemency or variation for case-by-case peculiarities, we presume
that healthy markets can solve problems on their own, and that they
will do the best we can do to account for general equilibrium consider
ations. Instead of trying to solve the economy’s problems directly by
private self-regulation or government oversight, we do our best just to
preserve the price competition that is its “central nervous system.”28
Call it populism or knee-jerking ideology or whatever else if that is
your inclination, but this particular brand of free-market fundamen
talism is not really a substantive or ideological faith, or at least it need
not be. It can seem so simplistic, sometimes so zealous and naive, but
there is a reason antitrust law has usually made this presumption of
broadly similar, self-sufficient markets rather than let defense experts
spin out whatever speculations they can dream up. As Taft explained
a long time ago, we abjure the sea of doubt for the practical sake of
having the policy at all.29 It is effectively a legal fiction to believe that
markets are the same in policy-relevant respects, and that their
problems are redressable through partial and comparatively static
analysis. Otherwise, the policy wouldn’t be worth the cost.30 There is a
28. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 224 n.59.
29. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898)
(Taft, J.), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (refusing “to say, in respect to contracts which
have no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual
restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public inter
est, and how much is not,” because that would be to “set sail on a sea of doubt”).
30. Cf. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2015),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d
Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (“the
law does not permit American Express to decide on behalf of the entire market
which legitimate forms of inter-brand competition should be available and which
should not.”); PHILIP I. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 562e,
101 (Supp. 2017) (writing of the American Express case that “competition,” rather
than private restraints, “should choose the optimal mix of revenue between the
two sides.”).
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certain delicious irony in the fact that this market liberalism has come
to be opposed much more by defendants and the political right than by
the left.
Indeed, there is a nice anecdotal record that markets tend to work
out solutions, even when clever theorists explain hypothetically before
the fact that they will not. That was true of the initial problem of “de
structive” price rivalry. It turned out to be a blackboard problem, even
in the presence of high fixed costs, because entrepreneurs and their
financiers avoid entry that would be suicide, and, in any event, with a
little differentiation prices do not actually go below average cost.31
Likewise, it seemed to some for some time that there might be “empty
cores” in some markets, for technological reasons, that would prevent
them from achieving equilibrium. One such sector was thought to be
ocean shipping for the simple and seemingly obvious reason that ships
are big and each one of them has a large capacity. Capacity could not
(or so it seemed) be added or subtracted except in such large incre
ments that equilibrium would almost certainly be some point in be
tween the addition or subtraction of the last ship. However, when the
antitrust immunity was finally removed for the shipping rings said to
be needed to solve that problem, ship owners managed to solve it quite
nicely with leasing and space-sharing agreements.32 Similarly, when
network effects were first elaborated, there followed many suggestions
that competition would not be workable in network markets, because
competition would be “for the field.” But it turns out that in many
such products competition can flourish so long as designs can be stan
dardized and shared, at least where the effect follows from some need
for technological interoperability.
Nevertheless, a strong tension has run through the law’s history to
challenge this simplicity. Since the very beginning—in Addyston Pipe,
for example, and even earlier—the tension has manifested in theoreti
cal critiques of competition itself.33 Courts have indulged that instinct
from time to time, and especially have done so in this latter season,
even though it seems deeply unlikely that Congress intended the law
to proceed by graduate social science seminar. Economists in both
1890 and 1914 were largely excluded from the law’s formulation. The
31. See Hovenkamp, supra note 7; Russell Pittman, Who Are You Calling Irrational?
Marginal Costs, Variable Costs, and the Pricing Practices of Firms, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST: ECON. ANALYSIS GROUP DISCUSSION PAPER (July 2009), https://www.justice
.gov/atr/who-are-you-calling-irrational-marginal-costs-variable-costs-and-pricing
-practices-firms [https://perma.unl.edu/5WGM-7QLP].
32. Chris Sagers, The Demise of Regulation in Ocean Shipping: A Study in the Evolu
tion of Competition Policy and the Predictive Power of Microeconomics, 39 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779 (2006).
33. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 220 (noting that the theory of “destructive”
price rivalry was already recognized in Marshall’s Principles of Economics in
1890).
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dozen or more times since then that Congress has intervened to re
verse judicial interpretations it has almost uniformly been to favor a
more pro-enforcement law, and sometimes explicitly to reject over
complexity. But put that aside for now. The next immediate question
is whether something about credit cards or platforms is a reason that
this time is finally different.
III.

ANTIRUST WITHOUT PLATFORM THEORY

Whether antitrust law is better off without platform theory seems
really like two broad questions. The first is whether there is some
thing especially good to preserve in typical platform markets that
couldn’t just be handled by the antitrust rules we’ve got. I’ll suggest
that the answer is no, using credit cards as the example. Second is
whether incorporating theory like this into antitrust invites bigger
problems than it is worth. I’ll suggest that the answer is yes.
The point will not be to show that the two-sided interaction phe
nomenon does not exist. It seems trivially obvious that it does on some
level and no one seriously doubts it. Both the problem of joint demand
and interdependent externalities seem to characterize common exam
ples given for two-sided interaction, like advertiser-supported newspa
pers, broadcast radio and television, and so on. Indeed those features
also seem to characterize multi-party payments systems. The question
is just whether something was preserved by the anti-steering rule that
was worth making it so hard to challenge.
A.

Are Credit Cards Really a Boon to Society and Would
Non-Platform Antitrust Wreck It?

The entire two-sided market agitation seems strange and counter
intuitive from a traditional antitrust point of view, and maybe too
clever for its own good. One of the strangest things about it is captured
in this observation from American Express: “[T]he fact that two-sided
platforms charge one side a price that is below or above cost reflects
differences in the two sides’ demand elasticity, not market power or
anticompetitive pricing.”34 That seems like bizarre, shifty double
speak, for the following reason: Pricing within a range of demand inelasticity is a textbook definition of market power.35 It is nevertheless a
basic claim in the literature, and Justice Thomas borrowed it almost
verbatim.36
34. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285–86 (2018).
35. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. PERLOFF ET AL., ESTIMATING MARKET POWER AND STRATEGIES
(2007).
36. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285–86 (citing Benjamin Klein et al.,
Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card
Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 574 (2006)).
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It does appear, however, that pricing differentials like this can
sometimes occur, even under vigorous competition. The problem fol
lows from joint demand. From the beginning of platform theory, theo
rists observed that even under perfect competition, the platform
operator may have a rational incentive to raise price on one side and
lower it on the other. That incentive follows from a problem of joint
demand that must be aggregated across two sets of consumers. Ordi
narily it wouldn’t matter that consumers value a good differently, be
cause each consumer’s desire is independent of all the others. It is not
necessary that all of them buy at any given price for the market to
reach equilibrium. In the case of a payment system, by contrast, two
different consumers (the merchant and the retail consumer) must
both be persuaded to consume the card-swipe transaction. Their two
demand curves must both be consulted to know what each would pay
for the payment method at any particular quantity, and they each
must be charged only that much or the transaction won’t happen.
Their interests in using the method are unlikely to be identical be
cause the benefits they get from it will differ. For this reason, even
under perfect competition, the platform operator will apportion its
own costs of producing the transaction between the parties according
to their elasticity—their willingness to pay at any given output. That
likely will be at different prices. Incidentally, platforms therefore
might solve a Coasian problem. The parties might have difficulty ne
gotiating the efficient allocation of the costs between them, and each
would be tempted to understate its own desire for the transaction.37
Nevertheless there is a very nice anti-competitive story of the antisteering rule that is perfectly consistent with these two-sided effects.
It depends on an oversight in the theory, or at least in legal applica
tions of it. Specifically, it takes elasticities as fixed and exogenous.
First, however, it is important to the story to point something else
out. Two-sided or no, competitive markets should still favor socially
lower-cost technologies over time. That seems not to have happened in
American payment systems, or at the least their evolution has not
been very responsive to costs in this way.
1.

Do Credit Cards Do Anything Special?

Credit cards are comparatively expensive and there is no clear evi
dence that they do anything especially better than their alternatives,
but they have been heavily used. Showing that might seem complex,
and indeed the payment systems literature involves some very com
plex modeling. Fortunately, however, the only really complex question
is one that is not relevant here—why payors choose one medium over
37. See Baxter, supra note 10, at 542–49.

400

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:389

another when they can choose among alternatives.38 That problem
mostly concerns private costs and benefits, which are not my concern.
The social costs are studied in a more straightforward, mostly empiri
cal literature.
By a significant margin, credit cards are the costliest payment
mechanism available in most countries. The cheapest method for
point-of-sale retail transactions—cheaper even than cash, perhaps by
a pretty large margin—is the PIN debit card.39 But, while debit cards
have grown considerably in use, they still distantly trail credit cards
in the United States in value of payments.40 And, to be clear, the cost
estimates in the literature account only for the direct social costs—
only the resources used in processing and securing the payments.
They do not account for the allocational effects if any of those charges
are supra-competitive, or the systemic risk of excessive consumer
debt, or the macro or distributional consequences of high-risk lending
to the poor. Unless there is some anticompetitive explanation, a more
costly technology should dominate only if its users benefit in some way
that outweighs its additional costs.
38. The complex literature that asks it begins with a pair of papers that worked out
the “Baumol-Tobin” model of transactions-demand for cash. William J. Baumol,
The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach, 66 Q.J.
ECON. 545 (1952); James Tobin, The Interest-Elasticity of Transactions Demand
for Cash, 38 REV. ECON. & STAT. 241 (1956). There followed some decades of very
complex mathematical modelling of the demand for different payment media.
See, e.g., Anthony M. Santomero & John J. Seater, Alternative Monies and the
Demand for Media of Exchange, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 942 (1996) (sur
veying literature and adding further modelling). The question has also generated
a substantial empirical literature. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Carow & Michael E.
Staten, Plastic Choices: Consumer Usage of Bank Cards versus Proprietary Credit
Cards, 28 J. ECON. & FIN. 216 (2002) (surveying literature).
39. Fumiko Hayashi & William R. Keeton, Measuring the Costs of Retail Payment
Systems, FED. RES. OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV., Second Quarter 2012 at 37, 57
(2012), https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/econrev/econrevarch
ive/2012/2q12hayashi-keeton.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/PEF8-KCHQ].
Defenders of the card companies point to one unpublished paper, funded by
Visa, that found credit cards to be no more socially costly than other payment
systems. Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz et al., The Economics of a Cashless Society: An
Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Payment Instruments, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT
CTR. ON REG. STUD., (Sept. 2004), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265
496400_The_Economics_of_a_Cashless_Society_An_Analysis_of_the_Costs_and_
Benefits_of_Payment_Instruments/download [https://perma.unl.edu/MR7U
JAKM]. That paper is at odds with most other estimates and depends for its re
sults on certain significant judgments. It excludes fixed costs entirely in counting
“social cost.” Measuring incremental cost is a proper measure of short-run indi
vidual choice, and so it makes sense as an explanation why a consumer would
choose a particular payment method among those on their person and accepted
by a given merchant. But it is not a complete measure of social cost.
40. U.S. FED. RES. SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY 2016 2–4 (2016)
[hereinafter FED. PAYMENT STUDY 2016].
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But indeed, the only additional benefits of credit cards seem like
relatively minor services. For consumers they combine a small pay
ment-systems convenience with a credit facility of a few thousand dol
lars at very high interest. For all the expanse of the literature, there is
fairly little systematic effort to show that credit cards do any particu
lar good in the world to justify their cost. To be clear, plenty of people,
who oftentimes have worked for or been subsidized by the card compa
nies, have been willing to say things like that they are “great innova
tions,” on par with “the microchip, the personal computer, and the
cellular telephone,” so significant that they “have transformed how
people live.”41 But there is less in the way of meaningful analysis of
those claims, and in particular almost no plausible effort to show that
credit cards specifically do anything better than their alternatives. In
a sixty-page law review article heavily relied on in American Express,
that touched on seemingly every argument ever raised in the debate,
the only effort to show that credit cards “create social benefit” is an
unelaborated claim in a footnote that they provide “relatively cheap
. . . credit.”42 That would seem uncommonly weak even were it sup
ported by more than citation to one article written by a credit-card
executive.43
Most payors don’t much use that line of credit as such, and few
probably should. That is, they don’t use cards to earn float, and those
who finance purchases that they would not otherwise have made prob
ably shouldn’t. As to the former, the float most consumers can make
on credit cards has long been minuscule.44 The evidence is that small
41. Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)Application of the Eco
nomics of Two-Sided Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 515, 515 (2005); Tom
Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 63, 63 (2006).
42. Klein et al., supra note 36, at 621 n.113.
43. See id. (citing Brown & Plache, supra note 41, at 71–74). At the time the cited
article was written, author Brown was a senior counsel for antitrust at Visa, Inc.
44. Claims are occasionally made to the contrary, see, e.g., Muris, supra note 41, at
526, n.30, but for most consumers it is really implausible. Imagine that a con
sumer averages $1000 in consumer purchases per month. By using a credit card
the consumer can keep $1000 in cash invested for about one month, which is
roughly the interest-free grace period for most credit card payments. The money
to pay off card debt must be quite liquid, because it must be accessible every
month, so it likely must be kept in a savings account or some similarly liquid
form. At present, the average interest rate for no-minimum-balance savings ac
counts in the United States is less than one-tenth of one percent. The float on
$1000, even if the interest compounds daily, would therefore be on the order of
about eight or nine cents per month.
Savings interest rates are presently rising, after many years at very low
levels. Also, money market accounts and other options might be relatively liquid
alternatives for some consumers to get somewhat higher rates. But even if overall
average rates reach levels they have not seen in a long time—say, 2.5%—the
monthly float on $1000, compounded daily, would be about two dollars.
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amounts of it do not influence consumer behavior,45 and if anything it
may just encourage inefficient payments methods and technologies
that would be avoided if negotiation were less costly.46 Whatever its
value, moreover, in this case it is a strictly private good. Credit card
float is just a transfer from payees to payors.
As to the other possible special value of credit cards, that consum
ers use them to finance purchases by carrying balances beyond the
interest-free grace period,47 they do in fact do it, of course. Visa and
Mastercard earn the majority of their revenue from it. Whether that is
a meaningful social good is a matter of strong opinions, but for what it
is worth, the evidence is fairly clear that credit card borrowers are
uncommonly vulnerable. Interestingly, both card ownership and use
are correlated with education, income, age, and other indicators of sta
bility, but use of cards for borrowing is predominantly by the young
and the poor.48 No consumers probably should revolve credit card bal
ances, in other words, and when they do, it is typically because they
are desperate or making bad decisions.
In any event, for merchants, the chief benefit in the absence of con
sumer rewards—I will have more to say about rewards in a second,
because I think they are a mechanism of anticompetitive harm—is
quick and ensured payment. But as to that, credit cards are of less
value than cash. In the end, the only uncontroversial social good in
payment cards is just a minor convenience. They obviate the need to
carry cash for all one’s purchases.49 And so, the business of processing
payments is very valuable to credit card companies, but not because

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

In any event, these amounts are so small that several years’ worth of them
could be outweighed by the fees, penalty, and interest for even one late payment.
See, e.g., Kirstin E. Wells, Are Checks Overused?, FED. RES. BANK OF MINN. Q.
REV., Fall 1996, at 2, 4 (finding that check usage grew substantially during a
period in which falling interest rates and faster check processing caused the
amount of available float to fall drastically). Business payors and payees un
doubtedly do consider float in arranging payments of any meaningful size, but for
that reason they individually negotiate those arrangements, and they do not by
and large make them by credit card. Cf. id.
An extremely interesting paper by two federal reserve bank economists set out a
careful Coasian analysis showing that the hunt for float has probably driven inef
ficient investments. Frictionless Coasian bargaining would likely have resulted
in change to some different and more socially desirable technology years ago. McAndrews & Roberds, infra note 48, at 23.
No doubt there is some non-zero value in the ability to make purchases during
the grace period, but it would already be captured by float. As just explained, the
significance of float seems negligible. See supra note 44.
See Kenneth A. Carow & Michael E. Staten, Plastic Choices: Consumer Usage of
Bank Cards Versus Proprietary Credit Cards, 26 J. ECON. & FIN. 216, 219–20
(2002) (summarizing empirical literature).
Under existing commercial law rules, credit cards provide fraud protection to
payors, and that may partly explain their much greater use in e-commerce,
though that would explain their prominence only relatively recently.
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they provide a service of unique value either to consumers or
merchants that only they can provide. Quite the contrary, their ser
vice seems both mundane and quite a bit more costly than its several
alternatives.
To be clear, my point is not to argue for antitrust liability or any
other government intervention because I think there is a superior pay
ments technology. Antitrust is committed with every fiber of its being
to let markets sort those problems out, and to keep markets healthy so
that they can do it well. The point is to ask how credit cards enjoyed so
much success and whether anticompetitive conduct had something to
do with it. The story probably involves some historical, accidental
path-dependence. There are some real peculiarities in the history of
the U.S. payments industry, like the long and essentially unique
American reliance on paper checks,50 and the peculiar fact that many
of our payment methods involve four parties instead of three.51 How
ever, those specific American details seem very unlikely to explain the
prominence of credit cards here. Instead, a costlier product persisted
precisely because those actors whose cost considerations would drive
efficiency have been de-sensitized to the costs. That then leads back to
the initial question, which was whether anti-steering and the rise of
the credit cards have been somehow anticompetitive.
50. Check writing in the United States is a very odd and still not well explained
peculiarity. Until about 2007, Americans used paper checks for a very large ma
jority of non-cash retail payments, much more than in comparable countries, and
while payment cards are now more often used by number of transactions, checks
still massively outweigh them by value. FED. PAYMENT STUDY 2016, supra note
40, at 2–3. That is so even though checks in the U.S. system are probably more
expensive than most other methods, both socially and privately. Since an influen
tial early paper examining this fact, David B. Humphrey & Alan N. Berger, Mar
ket Failure and Resource Use: Economic Incentives to Use Different Payment
Instruments, in THE U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEM: EFFICIENCY, RISK, AND THE ROLE OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE—PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM ON THE U.S. PAYMENT SYS
TEM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND (David B.
Humphrey ed., 1990), a series of papers have attempted to explain it. See, e.g.,
James McAndrews & William Roberds, The Economics of Check Float, FED. RES.
BANK OF ATL. ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter, 2000, at 17; Wells, supra note 45.
The problem is usually blamed on the decentralized nature of the U.S. bank
ing system—the result of laws that prohibited branching or expansion until fairly
recently—and the difficulty of negotiating efficient systems among the very large
number of individual American banks. McAndrews & Roberds, supra note 48, at
23. That problem was severe from very early in the history of U.S. banking, and
lasted much longer than in similar nations. See R. Alton Gilbert, The Advent of
the Federal Reserve and the Efficiency of the Payments System: The Collection of
Checks, 1915–1930, 37 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 121 (2000).
51. That is, checks and all other bank-issued payment systems began as four-party
systems just because there were so many banks in the United States, and that
fact follows because until the mid-20th century U.S. law sharply limited branch
ing and interstate banking.
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How a Platform Player Causes Harm on One Side

Again, the thing that seems fishy about the two-sided market de
fense is its suggestion that abusing the parties’ elasticities does not
reflect market power. What’s fishy about it is not the basic demonstra
tion of joint demand. It is that the theory takes the parties’ elasticities
as fixed and exogenous. To think it through, consider the following
imaginary example. As initially stated, it will seem rigged—one detail
makes it seem anticompetitive and unredeemed. But when we relax
its extreme feature we can ask whether it is really all that different
from the real world of credit cards.
Imagine that in a hypothetical town, a promoter organizes a club
among the townspeople to facilitate their retail purchases. Let’s call it
the “Star” club, because the members agree to shop only at “Star” es
tablishments. Merchants must pay the promoter for the right to dis
play the Star emblem on their premises, and the payment takes the
form of a small commission on every sale to a Star club member. To
get the townspeople to join his program, the promoter shares with
them part of the commission he collects from merchants. Merchants
remain free to charge whatever prices they like for their goods, except
that they may not charge Star members more than other customers.
The promoter might convince merchants to sign up by promising to
deliver only the most desirable customers—as for example by finding
those who are comparatively wealthy, inelastic, and likely to spend.
On that level the arrangement might seem like just a marketing ser
vice, and in fact American Express defended its business in just that
way. But it would also work as a coercive boycott to pressure
merchants into joining and giving up some of their surplus. The pro
moter would then split the spoils with the consumer members. Just as
the two-sided markets literature predicts, he will maximize his own
profit by balancing payments between the two sides according to their
elasticities. That seems anticompetitive, it involves only one side of
the platform, and it is hard to see anything especially good that would
be lost by making it illegal. Of course, what seems bad in that scenario
is something that is not present in current credit card markets, and
this is the way in which the hypothetical is rigged: it involves exclusiv
ity. In the actual world, credit card holders are free to shop anywhere.
However, that may not actually be such a meaningful distinction, be
cause the anti-steering rules might have a similar effect. As with the
Star club, merchants will find it unprofitable to reject a given credit
card once enough customers are devoted to it. But once customer loy
alty to a given card has been secured with premiums, or some other
desirable features, merchants could only persuade customers to drop
it by making them bear more of the cost of it. So, in the case of the
Star club, the promoter can make the merchants less price elastic to
his marketing service by convincing more high-value customers to
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shop only in Star establishments. Likewise, a card company makes
merchants less elastic to its transaction processing by securing more
high-value customers devoted to its card, as to whom the anti-steering
rule prevents any means of persuasion.
It might seem like a problem that this scenario is similar to some
other common relationships that we consider perfectly tolerable. For
example, it seems roughly analogous to shoppers’ clubs, like Costco, in
which the retailer compiles a dedicated base of consumers and uses it
to negotiate lower wholesale prices. For that matter, it seems analo
gous to any retail operation that builds big retail market share,
through low price or service or whatever, and then uses the resulting
leverage to get lower wholesale prices. However, the distinction is the
anti-steering rule. Both the Star club and a card company get an in
crease in negotiating power within a bilateral relationship not by com
peting better at the retail level, or by giving buyers there a better deal
or a better product. They keep the ordinary operation of markets from
imposing costs on buyers that buyers otherwise would bear. The rule
does that solely by way of contractual restraint imposed with market
power.
Critically, the card company very plausibly might pull this little
maneuver, and cause injury only on one side, without changing the
quantity of card swipes.
Thus, it seems significant that when price competition has been
attempted to secure more merchant adoptions—as Discover did—it’s
been of no effect and has been abandoned. It could also explain why
merchant fees vary so much without any evident impact on market
share. The Visa and Mastercard systems extract about 2% of the
purchase price of all transactions, while Discover takes only 1.5% and
yet has a very small market share, and American Express takes
upwards of 3% and maintains a big market share.
One last interesting question is why, even if this anticompetitive
story is correct, the card companies would use it to favor credit cards.
Why would the card companies prefer credit cards specifically, when
they could push more efficient systems, like PIN debit cards? The an
swer seems likely some combination of path-dependence and the op
portunity to sell high-interest credit. Interest and service charges are
important to all the major cards, and again are the majority of the
revenues of Mastercard and Visa. That could explain why debit cards
that offer any cardholder rewards remain rare.
B.

Will the Cat Really Stay in the Credit Card Bag?

A more general problem is whether the innovation introduced in
American Express has meaningful boundaries. Even if the outcome
was bad in the specific circumstances, maybe it will be limited to
them.
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Both the literature and American Express purport to give the the
ory some limits. For what it is worth, there really seem to be two sepa
rate economic criteria that are supposed to distinguish platforms from
other things, and it is not clear under American Express if they are
both required or how they relate. First, it appears that a market
should have mutually dependent network externalities. The value of
the product to each side must depend on the number of people using it
on the other. More important in practice, as the lower courts work out
the applicability of American Express, will probably be the limitation
to “simultaneous transaction” platforms. Despite the word chosen for
it, this requirement seems to depend not so much on literal, temporal
simultaneity. What is important is that the ratio of transactions be
tween the two sides will always be one to one. Every card swipe en
tails exactly one consumer service and exactly one merchant service,
coordinated by the network. It is simultaneity in this sense that cre
ates the problem of joint demand. It results in the platform owner ap
portioning costs differently to the two sides, even absent market
power. It is the thing that in the Court’s mind made card swipes one
product rather than two.
How many businesses are going to have those features? On the one
hand, some things commonly called “platforms” likely do not. Addriven businesses like Facebook and Google presumably are excluded
by the American Express Court’s pointed reaffirmation of its newspa
per cases.52 But on the other hand, it seems uncomfortably like a fair
number of them do. Gig economy businesses and party-to-party e-com
merce platforms, like Etsy, eBay, or Amazon Marketplace, seem likely
candidates. They display simultaneity in literal, temporal terms, and
arguably in the sense that each transaction they process requires joint
demand.
There will moreover be continual pressure to expand the rule’s ap
plicability, and there will be some receptiveness among the lower
courts to do it. Sellers of computer operating systems and smart
phones will sooner or later argue that every software purchase entails
distribution across their platform, in a simultaneous transaction that
must be jointly demanded by the app seller and the consumer. They
might argue that they should therefore be entitled to impose re
straints on the less elastic side that would seem grossly anticompeti
tive in traditional terms, because it will help them expand the other
side to everyone’s benefit. If Amazon ever is sued in the U.S. on the
monopolization claim that many expect to be coming, it presumably
will argue that even its regular business is not really just a retail
store. It is rather an online logistics agent and each individual sale is
therefore the joint consumption of a distribution service. And after all,
52. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018) (citing Times-Picayune
Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)).
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if Amazon is a two-sided platform, why isn’t a brick-and-mortar retail
store? Doesn’t a retail store also perform the balance required to inter
mediate between a manufacturer and a consumer? Just like American
Express, a retail store literally cannot earn any return on its business
unless it coordinates discrete, individual sale transactions that in
some more or less literal sense are each between one manufacturer
and one end-use consumer.
If any of that seems far-fetched, consider how easily some courts
seem already to have been persuaded by platform imagery. The judge
who wrote the Second Circuit opinion in American Express was cer
tain that American Express could not have market power—and was
willing to reject the fact-finding of a full merits trial—because he per
sonally gets a lot of mail.53 Indeed, within weeks of the ruling he
wrote, other defendants around the country were saying that they, too
were platforms. That was so though they seemed like pretty mundane
entities, including athletic leagues and health insurers. Elsewhere, se
rious, sophisticated thinkers are already prone to jumping to the plat
form conclusion, especially as to things having any connection to
electronics or the internet. When the government sued the Apple com
puter corporation and book publishers for fixing the prices of elec
tronic books, George Priest wrote that the case was probably bad
because it would frustrate the parties’ attempts to accommodate some
platform effects.54 But why on earth would that be? My demand for a
book requires no one else to demand anything, except in the sense that
the publisher and I must both value the retailer who delivers it. My
use and experience of it are unaffected by the number of others who
use it. Apple or Amazon selling books in one-on-one retail transactions
is no more the operation of a “platform” than Barnes & Noble selling
books in a physical store.
So while I hope that American Express has a fate like Dagher, I
fear that it will not.
Anyway, I will leave the discussion with one more general ques
tion, which I’ve asked a fair bit but to which no one seems to have an
53. No kidding. Judge Wesley said at oral argument that the companies must com
pete for cardholders because “I wouldn’t get any mail if they didn’t.” Chris Sag
ers, Appeals Court Rulings Thrust Antitrust Policy Into the Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/business/dealbook/appeals
court-rulings-thrust-antitrust-policy-into-the-spotlight.html [https://perma.unl
.edu/M9DN-FS8N]. With due respect, that is exactly like saying that cellophane
must compete with other products because DuPont lost sales at prices any higher
than three times the closest substitute. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400–01 (1956); Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the
Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281, 308–09 (1956).
54. George L. Priest, Apple Should Win Its E-Book Appeal, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15,
2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/george-priest-apple-should-win-its-e-book
appeal-1418600640 [https://perma.unl.edu/BJE3-W8M9].
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answer. On the American Express Court’s reasoning, why should plat
form theory be the only basis on which antitrust should consider ef
fects outside of conventionally conceived product markets? All
economic conduct has effects in more than one static partial equilib
rium. So why, on the Court’s reasoning, shouldn’t every antitrust case
be an exercise in general equilibrium analysis?
IV.

CONCLUSION: HOW ANTITRUST COMPLEXITY
DEVOLVES TO CONSERVATIVE SIMPLICITY

Despite the rhetoric in which such things are often couched—the
kind of rhetoric in Ronald Coase’s words that I quoted at the begin
ning—I think the Court’s motivation in American Express was not at
all about humility. Rather than the intellectual humility one might
infer from the adoption of elaborate science, it was an act of arrogant
self-confidence, and furthermore, it was strategic. Specifically, the
case redefines the product in a simultaneous transaction platform as
the jointly consumed transaction, rather than the individual parts
consumed by the two sides. On the Court’s view, there logically cannot
be injury if there are more total swipes or lower total charges per
swipe, no matter what anybody did to anybody. Better yet, the inter
dependency will seem like it must automatically constrain overall
price increases. Even if there might seem to be pricing power on one
side, as traditionally understood, the need to satisfy the participants
on the other side will discipline the platform’s abuse of whatever ap
parent power it’s got. This constraint in the mind of a conservative
judge will render any suggestion that card networks could have policyrelevant pricing power laughable. The result is a super-clever, seem
ingly irrefutable little trope useful for dismissing cases of the kind of
which the Court’s contemporary conservative bloc is overwhelmingly
fond. It is just like the simplifying gesture that antitrust law only
cares about output in narrowly defined product markets, or that it
only cares about inter-brand competition. It is like the one-monopoly
profit reasoning and the long-purse strategy of price predation. It is
like the insistence, with crabby skepticism, on full market definition
in nearly all cases.
For this reason, the business end of the now overwhelming pre
sumption against government action is in itself a very interesting phe
nomenon. It probably wasn’t logically necessary that it work out this
way, but to implement the presumption in its contemporary form has
usually made the law more complex. Some now say that as a result we
have a holistic, broad-minded, technocratic policy, able to consider the
richness of actual cases.55 That is probably misleading, however, be
55. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159
(2008).
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cause in practice complexity hasn’t made antitrust law more like so
cial science. It has really just traded one kind of simplicity for another.
The cost of putting on trials with fuller factual analysis has translated
in practice to most conduct no longer facing challenge at all, and to
plaintiffs often losing at the earliest stages when it is. As just one of
many examples, the decision to analyze resale price maintenance
(RPM) under the rule of reason was perhaps the chief triumph of the
struggle for this more scientific antitrust. Rule-of-reason treatment
was adopted with recognition that RPM could in fact be harmful some
times, and with promises that it would still be subject to challenge.56
But the consequence has been that RPM is now only challenged in
Maryland and California, the two places where it remains per se ille
gal under state law. Plaintiff lawyers just don’t bring RPM cases any
where else because of the cost and difficulty of rule of reason challenge
is prohibitive. In other words, the decision to make analysis of RPM
holistic and inclusive, even though the judges that did it realized that
it could still sometimes be dangerous, has just made it effectively per
se legal. And so, as the antitrust left looks back fondly on those days of
simple rules and cases that could be won, it often seems that complex
ity itself is the enemy. In other words, when some said “we need more
science in antitrust,” it sounded to the left like they didn’t actually
care so much about science. They just wanted plaintiffs more often to
lose.
For better or worse, even that is not so obvious, because it turns
out that legal complexity is not in itself inherently conservative or lib
eral. Sometimes complex rules favor plaintiffs and simple ones favor
defendants. The bargaining model of harm from vertical integration,
for example, is pretty complex, and it probably can’t be deployed in
litigation except on a big evidentiary record and competing expert
opinions. That is a theory from the left, since it was brought to anti
trust to help win against defendants, and it too was developed to con
front conservative simplicity. All merger challenge got more difficult
after United States v. General Dynamics.57 After the Federal Trade
Commission lost in FTC v. Fruehauf in 1979,58 doubts grew so great
about the viability of vertical merger challenges that the government
would not bring another one for nearly forty years. The complexity of
bargaining theory, in other words, was devised to confront what in
effect had become the very simple rule that “vertical mergers are le
gal.” There are any number of other examples. Theoretical criticisms
have been advanced of the “one monopoly profit” theory, with the goal
that people could bring tying and bundling cases again. However, the
criticism is blisteringly complex, and it is hard to imagine even the
56. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 897–98 (2007).
57. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
58. Fruehauf Corp. v. F.T.C., 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
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federal judge—let alone the jury—that will fully master it in litiga
tion.59 As a matter of fact, the theory of harm in Microsoft60—hardly a
conservative one, as applied in that case—was really a platform the
ory, of all things, though the courts deployed it without invoking the
literature. Likewise, simple rules can be made just as favorable to de
fendants as to plaintiffs. Conduct can in principle be made per se le
gal, after all, and rules can also be stated in simple terms that are
stacked against enforcement. There is something of a bright-line rule
among some lower courts, for example, that exclusive contracts cannot
be illegal if their duration is less than one year.61 Likewise, the costbased test of price predation is on one level very simple and very
bright-line. It can be complex in litigation, because disagreements
over accounting conventions creep in that are mind-boggling,62 but in
principle it is quite simple indeed. Either a plaintiff can show price
below average variable cost or not, and since that has proven all but
impossible, price predation is effectively per se legal.63 The bottom-est
of bottom lines in antitrust law is that most of us love simple rules,
and most of us hate them too. You love them when they go your way,
and you hate them when they don’t. So, even if simplicity is good, it
remains to choose which simple rules are best.
That returns me to the fact that American Express seems like a
complicated case and it turns on a complex theoretical literature. Yet
its real appeal to the Court’s majority seemed actually to be something
very simple. Namely, a case against a platform defendant can always
be dismissed if plaintiff fails to prove a loss of output in the jointly
demanded product. On that I will close where I began, with Coase.
Superficially, Coase seemed above all to stress that economists
should behave as scientists. In another part of the famous essay I
quoted at the beginning, he said the problem was that the industrial
organization theory of his day effectively pressured economists to be
have like “economic statesmen.”64 As he said, “[t]he desire to be of ser
vice to one’s fellows is, no doubt, a noble motive.”65 The problem was
that “it is not possible to influence policy if you do not give an an
59. Einer Elhauge & Barry Nalebuff, The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties, 33 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 68 (2017); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death
of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009).
60. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
61. See Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 1997);
Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984).
62. See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116–21 (10th Cir. 2003).
63. There is some minor dispute over how frequently predation claims are made and
how frequently they enjoy any success, but on any measure they are extremely
rare and almost always fail. See Chris Sagers, #LOLNothingMatters, supra note
18, at 22, n.84 (2018).
64. COASE, supra note 2, at 66.
65. Id.
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swer.”66 Because it is difficult to give answers in the presence of em
pirical uncertainty, economists avoided “critical questioning of the
data and the worth of the analysis,” and “tolerate[d] standards of evi
dence and analysis which . . . they would otherwise have rejected.”67
That allowed them to “provide answers even when there are not
answers.”68
But consider Coase’s own work. There is something in his most fa
mous paper that my fellow left-leaners love to point out, because they
think it shows that he was actually their hero. The Problem of Social
Cost did not merely introduce what we now know as Coase’s theorem.
The latter half of the paper argued at length that property rights do
matter because there are in fact transaction costs. To many on the left,
Coase’s admonition that economists and policymakers must consider
all the intricate resulting complexity seems like proof that the law
and-economics movement misunderstood him entirely. It seems to
have ignored what really was his call for substantial public interven
tion in markets.
But I suspect that’s a pretty inaccurate take, at least as to
whatever Coase himself believed. As for his paper’s observation that
theory abstracts from reality, and that its application therefore re
quires empirical care, it is a very obvious criticism. It is at least as old
as Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment and it was central to the
famous struggle between German and classical economics perhaps a
hundred years before The Problem of Social Cost. But more important
than its lack of novelty or substance, it is just so easy to admonish the
world to be careful of undue abstraction, while largely impossible to
obey. And indeed, Coase himself never obeyed it. I would have no idea
what really was in his personal heart or intentions, but he made no
contribution to the overwhelming empirical investigation he recom
mended. It seems unlikely that he really expected anyone would actu
ally undertake it, or that we would then use law to eradicate all the
social evils we’d found. Candid recognition of this fact is rare,69 but it
seems pretty clear that the real goal was just to claim that govern
ment should not act in the presence of uncertainty. A person who
makes that claim, knowing that uncertainty is practically insur
mountable, is really just arguing that government should be small and
inert. In other words, it is not science to make such a claim, it is ideol
ogy. Complexity has just been the tool of a particular kind of very con
servative simplicity.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 66–67.
But see George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradi
tion, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 2–6 (2010).

